Recollective Experience During Recognition of Emotional Words in Clinical Depression by Jermann, Françoise et al.
Recollective Experience During Recognition of Emotional
Words in Clinical Depression
Françoise Jermann & Martial Van der Linden &
Maïté Laurençon & Bruno Schmitt
Published online: 1 August 2008
# Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2008
Abstract Earlier work has shown that free recall tasks
produce a robust mood-congruent memory effect in depres-
sion, whereas recognition tasks produce heterogeneous
results. This study aimed to further investigate recognition
memory for positive, negative and neutral words in
depressed patients and matched comparison participants
with the Remember/Know/Guess procedure for assessing
recollection and familiarity. No mood-congruent memory
bias effect was detected in discrimination abilities. However,
depressed patients recollected (more Remember responses)
more negative than positive or neutral words, whereas
comparison participants recollected more positive than
neutral words. No mood-congruent pattern was evidenced
for Know responses. However, the depressed patients
responded to fewer words overall with Know responses than
the comparison participants. These results suggest that the
mood-congruent memory pattern in depressed patients is
related to conscious recollection rather than to familiarity.
Attentional biases toward negative words and elaboration
processes and/or encoding in reference to the self may
contribute to these findings.
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Mood-congruent memory corresponds to the tendency to
retrieve information consistent with one’s mood (for a
review: Blaney 1986; Watkins et al. 2000). In other words,
people recall or recognize stimuli that are in accordance
with their mood (e.g., negative words in the case of
depressed people) better than stimuli that are not in
accordance with their mood (e.g., positive words in the
case of depressed people). Results of studies that have
investigated memory for emotional words in depression
with implicit memory tasks are contradictory (e.g., Bradley
et al. 1996; Ruiz-Caballero and González 1997; Watkins et
al. 1992, 1996; Danion et al. 1995; Denny and Hunt 1992)
while results obtained with explicit recall tasks are much
clearer and have often detected a mood-congrent memory
bias in depressed people (e.g., Danion et al. 1995; Denny
and Hunt 1992; Neshat-Doost et al. 1998; Ruiz-Caballero
and González 1997).
Findings obtained with recognition tasks are inconsistent
(Danion et al. 1995; Deijen et al. 1993; Dunbar and
Lishman 1984; Moritz et al. 2005; Neshat-Doost et al.
1998). These studies explored recognition memory for
neutral, positive and negative words in a clinically
depressed patient group and a comparison participant group
and analyzed their results on the basis of signal detection
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theory, which enables one to assess participants’ discrim-
ination capacities and response bias (tendency to answer
yes or no whenever they have to recognize a word).
Regarding discrimination capacities, only one study
showed a mood-congruent memory bias in depressed
patients (Dunbar and Lishman 1984). The other studies
showed a range of different results, for example, that both
groups (depressed and comparison participants) discrimi-
nated positive and negative words better than neutral words
(Deijen et al. 1993) or worse than neutral words (Neshat-
Doost et al. 1998). The results were also contradictory for
the response bias score. Danion et al. (1995) found that
neither the participants’ status (depressed vs. comparison
participants) nor the valence of the words had an influence
on the response bias score. Dunbar and Lishman (1984)
and Deijen et al. (1993), however, found that depressed
patients and comparison participants differed regarding the
response bias for positive words. Indeed, Dunbar and
Lishman (1984) found that depressed patients showed a
conservative bias for these words (i.e., they tended to
answer “no” consistently) whereas Deijen et al. (1993)
obtained exactly the opposite result (liberal bias, that is the
patients tended to answer “yes”). In addition, Dunbar and
Lishman (1984) showed that depressed patients have a
more conservative response bias for neutral words than
comparison participants.
Recently, Moritz et al. (2005) investigated recognition
memory for neutral, depression-relevant, positive, and
delusion-relevant words in depressed patients and compar-
ison participants. No mood-congruent memory bias was
evidenced for the percentage of hits but the authors showed
that depressed people produced more false alarms for
negative words than the comparison participants. It should
be noted that these authors did not analyze their data
according to signal detection theory.
The inconsistent results of all these recognition tasks
could be related to differences in the material used (e.g., the
type and number of words), the procedures (e.g., the
encoding conditions) and/or the type of participants
included (e.g., hospitalized or ambulatory depressed
patients).
In light of these heterogeneous results, the mood-
congruent recognition bias needed to be re-examined. In
addition to overall recognition performance, it was impor-
tant to measure the subjective state of awareness associated
with each recognition judgment, which was done by using
the “Remember/Know/Guess” (R/K/G) procedure
(Gardiner 1988; Tulving 1985). The R/K/G procedure has
been shown to result in a more fine-grained analysis of
recognition memory than standard recognition tasks (e.g.,
Perfect et al. 1995). According to Gardiner and Richardson-
Klavehn (2000), a recognition judgment can be made either
because one recollects the encoded information, which
means that some contextual details associated with the
stimulus are recovered (Remember response), or because
one has a feeling of familiarity without having any other
information (Know response). The possibility of respond-
ing “I guess” (Guess response) when one does not
remember or know was added to the original procedure in
order to separate the Guess responses from the Know
responses (see Gardiner et al. 1998). The R/K procedure
has been found to be an efficient research tool to investigate
cognitive functioning in psychopathological states (e.g.,
schizophrenia, Danion et al. 2003; Huron et al. 1995;
dysphoria, Ramponi et al. 2004).
Only one study has used the R/K procedure to
investigate memory performance in dysphoria (Ramponi
et al. 2004), and it used only neutral words. Participants had
to encode words in two different conditions: phonemic
(count the number of syllables) and semantic (think about
the meaning of the word and rate it on a scale from concrete
to abstract). The results showed that dysphoric participants
recollected (Remember responses) fewer words than com-
parison participants and that both groups’ recollection was
poorer after the phonemic than after the semantic encoding
condition. However, familiarity (Know responses) was
unaffected by dysphoric mood or by encoding condition.
No previous study investigated recognition memory for
neutral, negative and positive words in clinical depression
with the R/K/G procedure.
Past studies using the R/K/G procedure showed that
experimental manipulations that divided the attention focus
during encoding (e.g., encoding words while tracking an
auditory tone) decreased the number of Remember responses
(e.g., Mangels et al. 2001; Parkin et al. 1995) but has little
impact on the number of Know responses (Mangels et al.
2001) or has no impact at all (Parkin et al. 1995). One
possible hypothesis regarding depressed patients is that
rumination, which has been shown to disrupt controlled
processing (Hertel 1998), decreases the amount of attention
that can be allocated to the encoding of words. Consequently,
it can be postulated that depressed patients will produce fewer
Remember responses overall than comparison participants.
Furthermore, the level of processing was also shown to
be a variable that influences recollection (Remember
responses) but leaves the number of Know responses
unaffected (e.g., Gardiner et al. 1999; Khoe et al. 2000).
In depression, it can be assumed that an activated negative
self-schema could favor a deep level of processing for
negative words (semantic processing) at encoding, as well
as an enhanced level of elaboration (encoded stimuli are
related or linked to other information available in memory)
of these words. Consequently, it can be postulated that
depressed patients should show enhanced recollection
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(Remember responses) for negative words whereas famil-
iarity (Know responses) should not be affected by the
interaction of depressed mood state and the emotional
valence of the words.
Method
Participants
Twenty French-speaking depressed patients constituted the
clinical group. Five participants (four women and one man)
were hospitalized at the time of participation, while 15 (13
women and 2 men) were ambulatory outpatients. Patients
were recruited from an adult psychiatric hospital and from
the outpatient department of the same hospital (hôpital de
jour). The study was approved by the clinical institution in
which it took place. All patients were diagnosed during
routine clinical treatment for major depressive episode by
an experienced psychiatrist according to the DSM-IV
criteria (American Psychiatric Association 1994). The
exclusion criteria were a bipolar disorder, ongoing sub-
stance abuse and/or a neurological problem that would
impair cognitive functioning. The patients were referred to
the experimenter (third author) by two psychiatrists.
Comorbid disorders were not documented and anxiety
disorders cannot be excluded. The inpatients were hospi-
talized for at least one week and the experimental
procedures were administered then. For the outpatients,
the experimental procedures were administered as they
participated in a day hospital program. None of the patients
was in remission. The mean age of the clinical group was
42.20±7.25 years and their mean number of years of
education was 13.25±3.84. The Beck Depression Inventory
(BDI-II, Beck et al. 1996; French version: Éditions du
Centre de Psychologie Appliquée 1998) was used to assess
the current severity of their depressive symptomatology. The
depressed participants included in this study all scored
higher than 17 on the BDI-II (mean score: 35.75±11.00).
The participants’ BDI-II scores correspond to mild to severe
depressive symptomatology (2 patients were in a mild
depressive state, 2 in a moderate depressive state and 16
in a severe depressive state). The mean number of past
depressive episodes was 3.45±1.50 (min. 1, max. 7).
All patients except one were taking antidepressant medica-
tion at the time of testing [11 patients were taking an
SSRI (selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor), 5 an SNRI
(serotonin–norepinephrine reuptake inhibitor), 2 patients a
TCA (tricyclic antidepressant) and 1 a NaSSA (norad-
renergic and specific serotonergic)]. Moreover, 13 patients
were taking a benzodiazepine at the time of testing and 2
patients a neuroleptic medication (prescribed to reduce
anxiety symptoms) while one patient was on both kinds of
medication.
Twenty gender-, age- and education-matched compari-
son participants were recruited from the same cultural
community as the depressed patients (mean age: 42.25±
6.73 years; mean number of years of education: 14.20±
3.12). Participants in the comparison group had not
previously suffered from clinical depression and had no
prior neurological impairment or history of substance
abuse. Their BDI-II scores were all below 7 (the mean
score for the comparison group was 2.10±2.29).
Material
The stimulus pool used in this study is composed of 66
French verbs ending with -er. These words were selected
from a list of 300 French verbs created by the first author. A
group of 20 students rated each word in the list according to
its affective valence and mental imageability. Valence was
evaluated on a Likert scale from 1 (very positive) to 7 (very
negative). Mental imagery was evaluated on a Likert scale
from 1 (difficult to represent mentally) to 7 (easy to
represent mentally). Sixty-six verbs were selected: 22 that
represent positive affective valence (e.g., ‘to triumph,’ ‘to
admire’), 22 that represent negative affective valence (e.g.,
‘to depress,’ ‘to beg’) and 22 that represent neutral affective
valence (e.g., ‘to measure,’ ‘to pivot’). These verbs had
equivalent (a) frequency of occurrence in the French
language (LEXIQUE database, New et al. 2001) (neutral:
4.59±3.44; negative: 4.11±3.90; positive: 4.54±4.12); (b)
number of letters (each valence group had six nine-letter
words, six eight-letter words and ten seven-letter words);
and (c) degree of mental imageability (neutral: 3.42±1.05;
negative: 3.79±0.88; positive: 3.82±1.09). Each group
differed according to its valence value (neutral: 3.65±
0.23; negative: 5.96±0.57; positive: 2.33±0.43).
Each group of 22 valenced words was subdivided into
two sets of 11 verbs (set A and set B). This was done in
order to use either set A or set B as targets. Among each
group of valenced words, the two sets were equivalent
according to (a) the frequency of occurrence of the words in
the French language; (b) the number of letters; (c) the
degree of mental imagery; and (d) the valence value.
The order of word presentation during encoding and
during recognition was counterbalanced across participants
(two encoding orders, E1 and E2, and two recognition
orders, R1 and R2). For 12 participants in each group, set A
was used as targets and set B as distractors, and for the
remaining eight participants, set B was used as targets and
set A as distractors. For half of the participants of each
group (six who saw set A as targets and four who saw set B
as targets), words were encoded in the E1 order, and for the
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other half, words were encoded in the E2 order. For half
of the participants who encoded words in the E1 order,
the recognition order was R1 and for the other half the
recognition order was R2. The same was true for the
participants who encoded words in the E2 order.
Procedure
The session began with the signing of an informed consent
form. Then some personal information (age, number of
years of education and number of past depressive
episodes) was collected and the BDI-II was completed.
After this, the recognition task was presented. The task ran
on E-Prime 1.0. Participants were seated in front of a 15″
screen. The recognition task began with a learning phase
(encoding 33 target words). Words always appeared one at
a time in lower case in the center of the screen in white on
a black background (character size: Arial 60). Participants
had to read aloud and memorize the words, which
appeared on the screen for 4 s. The instruction that
appeared on the screen was the following: “Memory task:
You will see a series of words on the screen. These words
are going to appear on the screen one by one for 4 seconds
each. Your task will be to read these words aloud and to
look at them carefully so you can recognize them later
on.” There was no attempt to promote a specific level of
processing (e.g., surface or deep encoding). The interstim-
ulus time was 1 second. After the encoding phase,
participants had to count backwards in ones for 1 min,
starting at 136. Then the recognition phase began. Words
from the encoding phase (33 target words) were inter-
mixed with new words (33 distractor words). Participants
had to decide whether they had seen the presented word
before. Each time participants recognized a word, they had
to describe their recognition awareness in more detail.
They could answer either “I remember” (R), “I know” (K)
or “I guess” (G). Participants received detailed instructions
about the distinction between R, K and G responses before
the recognition phase. These instructions were adapted
from those used by Gardiner and colleagues (Gardiner et
al. 1998). Briefly, participants were told that an R response
should be given to any word which, at the time it was
recognized, brought to mind something they had con-
sciously experienced (e.g., an association, a thought, a
feeling). In contrast, they were asked to make a K response
if the word felt familiar but they were unable to recollect
details of its prior exposure. Finally, they were asked to
make a G response if they were unsure whether or not the
word had been presented in the study phase. As soon as the
participant gave an answer, the experimenter pressed a key
so that the next word appeared. Participants had unlimited
time to make their judgments and no data were collected
regarding the decision time.
Data Analysis
The overall recognition performance for each type of word
(neutral, negative and positive) was examined from the
perspective of signal detection theory (Snodgrass and
Corwin 1988). Two measures, namely a discrimination
index (capacity to recognize a studied word among
distractor words) and a response bias index (tendency to
answer “yes” or “no” when having to recognize a word),
were computed following Snodgrass and Corwin’s (1988)
method. These indices were computed separately for each
valence. Proportions of hits and false alarms (FAs) for each
valence were transformed into Z scores. The Z score for a
given probability corresponds to the quantile function of the
normal distribution. Proportions needed to be corrected
before they were transformed into Z scores in order to
avoid infinite Z scores when a proportion was equal to 1 or
0. The hits and FAs, respectively, were corrected with the
following formulae: Pcorrected hitð Þ ¼ number of hitsþ 0:5ð Þ=
number of studied wordsþ 1ð Þ and Pcorrected FAð Þ ¼ numberð
of FAs þ 0:5Þ= number of distractor wordsþ 1ð Þ. Correct-
ed hit and FA probabilities were then transformed into Z
scores: respectively, [Z(Pcorrectedhit)] and [Z(PcorrectedFA)].
A discrimination index (d′) was obtained for each valence by
the following formula: [Z(Pcorrectedhit)] – [Z(PcorrectedFA)]. A
d′ value of 0 or less indicates that subjects were unable to
discriminate studied words from distractor words. A high d′
value indicates good discrimination abilities. A response
bias index (C) for each valence was obtained by the
following formula: 0:5 Z Pcorrectedhitð Þ½  þ Z PcorrectedFAð Þ½ .
A C index with a positive sign indicates a conservative bias
(participants have tendency to answer “no” when they have
to recognize a word) and a C index with a negative sign
indicates a liberal bias (participants have tendency to answer
“yes” when they have to recognize a word).
Moreover, according to the recommendations of
Wilkinson and the Task Force on Statistical Inference
(1999), effect sizes for main and interaction effects of the
ANOVAs are reported (partial eta squares—h2p).
Non-parametric Mann–Whitney U tests were computed
to compare inpatients (n=5) and outpatients (n=15) on all
measures (total hits, proportion of R, K and G for hits, false
alarms (FAs), proportion of R, K and G for FAs) and
showed no significant effects. Consequently, the analyses
amalgamate in- and outpatients.
Results
For each group and for each valence (neutral, negative and
positive), means (and standard deviations) for total hits and
for the number of R, K and G responses for hits are
presented in Table 1, as are means (and standard deviations)
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for total FAs and for the number of R, K and G responses
for FAs.
Analyses of Proportions of Hits
Separate 2 (group) × 3 (valence) ANOVAs were conducted
on the overall proportion of hits and on the amount of R, K
and G responses for hits.
Regarding the total proportion of hits, there was no
significant effect [valence: F(2,76)=2.677; p=0.08; h2p ¼
0:07; group: F(1,38)=2.76; p=0.11; h2p ¼ 0:07; interaction
(F(2,76)=2.414; p=0.10; h2p ¼ 0:06].
The results for R responses showed no group effect [F
(1,38)=0.00; p=0.98; h2p ¼ 0:00] but a significant valence
effect [F(2,76)=8.058; p<0.01; h2p ¼ 0:18], and a signifi-
cant interaction [F(2,76)=5.434; p<0.01; h2p ¼ 0:13].
Planned comparisons showed no differences between
depressive patients and comparison participants regarding
the number of R responses for neutral, negative and
positive words [neutral: F(1,38)=1.276; p=0.27; negative:
F(1,38)=2.602; p=.12; positive: F(1,38)=0.225; p=0.64).
However, the depressed patient group gave more R
responses for negative words than for neutral words (F
(1,38)=19.71; p<0.001); they also gave more R responses
for positive words than for neutral words [F(1,38)=8.593;
p<0.01]. The difference between the number of R
responses for negative compared to positive words
approached significance [F(1,38)=3.738; p=0.06]; more R
responses were given for negative than positive words.
Comparison participants made marginally more R
responses for positive than for neutral words [F(1,38)=
3.819; p=0.06]. No other difference between valences was
significant (neutral vs. negative: F(1,38)=0.074; p=0.79;
negative vs. positive: F(1,38)=2.992; p=0.09).
The results for K responses showed no valence effect or
interaction effect [respectively, F(2,76)=1.149; p=0.32;
h2p ¼ 0:03, and F(2,76)=0.067; p=0.94; h2p ¼ 0:00], but a
significant group effect [F(1,38)=5.260; p<0.05; h2p ¼
0:12]. Depressed subjects gave fewer K responses than
comparison participants.
The results for G responses showed no significant
effects [valence: F(2,76)=1.564; p=0.22; h2p ¼ 0:04; group:
F(1,38)=0.542; p=0.47; h2p ¼ 0:01; interaction: F(2,76)=
1.314; p=0.28; h2p ¼ 0:03].
Analyses of Proportions of FAs
Separate 2 (group) × 3 (valence) ANOVAs were conducted
on the total proportion of FAs and on the amount of R, K
and G responses for FAs.
The results for the total proportion of FAs showed no
significant effects [valence: (F(2,76)=1.628; p=0.20;
h2p ¼ 0:04; group: F(1,38)=0.025; p=0.87; h2p ¼ 0:00;
interaction: F(2,76)=2.701; p=0.07; h2p ¼ 0:07].
The results for the amount of R responses for FAs
also showed no valence or group effects [respectively,
F(2,76)=1.863; p=0.16; h2p ¼ 0:05, and F(1,38)=0.769;
p=0.39; h2p ¼ 0:02], but there was a significant interaction
[F(2,76)=3.456; p<0.05; h2p ¼ 0:08]. Planned comparisons
showed no difference between depressed and comparison
participants for any valence group [neutral: F(1,36)=1.678;
p=0.20; negative: F(1,36)=2.028; p=0.16; positive:
F(1,36)=0.559; p=0.46). However, the depressed patients
gave more R responses for FAs for negative words than
positive words [F(1,38)=7.691; p<0.01]. The depressed
patients’ results showed no difference between neutral and
negative words [F(1,38)=3.231; p=0.08] or between
neutral and positive words [F(1,38)=0.912; p=0.35]. For
Table 1 Means (standard deviations) for proportions of total Hits and FAs, for the amount of R, K and G responses, for discrimination scores (d′)
and for response bias scores (C) for neutral, negative and positive words
Depressive patients Comparison participants
Neutral Negative Positive Neutral Negative Positive
Hits Total 0.67 (0.24) 0.81 (0.17) 0.73 (0.19) 0.81 (0.19) 0.81 (0.17) 0.83 (0.15)
R * 0.30 (0.22) a 0.53 (0.21) b 0.44 (0.25) c 0.39 (0.26) d 0.40 (0.27) d,e 0.48 (0.30) e
K 0.21 (0.17) 0.15 (0.13) 0.16 (0.14) 0.30 (0.20) 0.26 (0.21) 0.27 (0.22)
G 0.16 (0.14) 0.13 (0.13) 0.13 (0.10) 0.12 (0.14) 0.15 (0.15) 0.08 (0.10)
FAs Total 0.15 (0.11) 0.26 (0.26) 0.20 (0.16) 0.22 (0.18) 0.20 (0.17) 0.21 (0.16)
R * 0.04 (0.06) a,b 0.09 (0.17) a 0.03 (0.06) b 0.02 (0.05) d 0.03 (0.08) d,e 0.04 (0.09) e
K 0.05 (0.07) 0.07 (0.12) 0.07 (0.11) 0.09 (0.09) 0.07 (0.08) 0.07 (0.09)
G 0.06 (0.07) 0.10 (0.12) 0.10 (0.12) 0.11 (0.12) 0.10 (0.12) 0.10 (0.09)
d′ 1.47 (0.71) 1.65 (0.71) 1.58 (0.64) 1.75 (0.97) 1.73 (0.79) 1.74 (0.68)
C 0.25 (0.47) −0.09 (0.61) 0.12 (0.52) −0.05 (0.38) −0.04 (0.38) −0.09 (0.36)
*Within each group, means that do not share a letter are statistically different based on planed comparisons.
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the comparison participants, the difference between neutral
and positive word approached significance [F(1,38)=3.648;
p=0.06]. No other difference between valences was
significant [neutral vs. negative: F(1,38)=0.129; p=0.72;
negative vs. positive F(1,38)=0.728; p=0.40].
The results for K responses for FAs showed no
significant effects [valence: F(2,76)=0.03; p=0.97;
h2p ¼ 0:00, group: F(1,38)=0.42; p=0.52; h2p ¼ 0:01, inter-
action: F(2,76)=0.58; p=0.56; h2p ¼ 0:02].
The results for G responses for FAs showed no
significant effects either [valence: F(2,76)=0.396; p=0.67;
h2p ¼ 0:01, group: F(1,38)=0.315; p=0.58; h2p ¼ 0:01,
interaction: F(2,76)=1.424; p=0.25; h2p ¼ 0:04].
Discrimination and Response Bias Indices
The discrimination and response bias indices (d′ and C) for
each group and valence are presented in Table 1. Separate 2
(group) × 3 (valence) ANOVAs were conducted on the d′
and C indices.
The results for the d′ index showed no significant
effects [valence: F(2,76)=0.220; p=0.80; h2p ¼ 0:01; group:
F(1,38)=0.768; p=0.39; h2p ¼ 0:02; interaction: F(2,76)=
0.325; p=0.72; h2p ¼ 0:01].
The results for the C index also showed no significant
effects [valence: F(2,76)=2.214; p=0.12; h2p ¼ 0:06; group:
F(1,38)=1.713; p=0.20; h2p ¼ 0:04; interaction: F(2,76)=
2.969; p=0.06; h2p ¼ 0:07].
Pearson Correlations
In order to investigate whether the memory bias observed in
the depressed patient group is related to the amount of
reported depressive symptoms and/or to the number of past
depressive episodes, Pearson correlations were computed.
To do these analyses, two memory bias indices were
computed for the hits and the FAs with R responses: (a)
Neu-Neg, which corresponds to a bias toward negative
words over neutral words (the percentage of R responses
for negative words is subtracted from the percentage of R
responses for neutral words); (b) Pos-Neg, which corre-
sponds to a bias toward negative words over positive words
(the percentage of R responses for negative words is
subtracted from the percentage of R responses for positive
words). The results showed no significant correlation
between the BDI-II score and the memory bias indices
nor was there a significant correlation between the
number of past episodes and the memory bias indices
(see Table 2).
Finally, correlations between the BDI-II score, the
number of past depressive episodes and the total number
of K responses for hits were considered. The results showed
that there was no significant correlation between the
number of K responses for hits and the BDI-II score
[r(20)=−0.32; p=0.17] or between the number of K
responses for hits and the number of past depressive
episodes [r(20)=−0.18; p=0.45].
Discussion
The aim of this study was to explore recognition memory
for neutral, negative and positive words in depressed
participants by using the R/K/G procedure. No mood-
congruent memory pattern was evidenced for the propor-
tion of hits and the discrimination index. However, some
evidence of a mood-congruent memory pattern was seen in
depressed patients when they consciously recollected words
(R responses). Furthermore, the results showed that
depressed patients gave fewer K responses overall than
comparison participants.
Several factors may potentially have contributed to the
mood-congruent pattern found in the present study when
words were consciously recollected (R responses). First,
several studies showed that depressed patients present an
attentional bias toward negative material (Gotlib et al.
2004; Mogg et al. 1995; Joormann 2004; Murphy et al.
1999). It could be that an attentional bias during the
encoding phase may favor the creation of links between the
negative words and other contents available in memory. A
second potential explanation could be related to the
cognitive schemata that characterize depressed patients
(Beck et al. 1979). It can be hypothesized that a strongly
interconnected negative cognitive structure as identified by
Table 2 Pearson correlations between the BDI-II score, the number of past depressive episodes and the memory bias indices for the depressed
patient group
BDI-II Number of past depressive episodes
r p r p
Hits R Neu-Neg 0.24 0.31 0.07 0.78
Pos-Neg 0.19 0.43 −0.11 0.64
FAs R Neu-Neg −0.27 0.26 0.16 0.50
Pos-Neg −0.25 0.28 0.10 0.68
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Dozois and Dobson (2001) in depressed people facilitates
the encoding of new negative words and the creation of
associations. This may also account for the finding that
depressed patients provide more R responses for FAs
regarding negative words compared to positive words. It
could be that irrelevant associations may be more easily
activated and may erroneously provide false contextual
information (false recognition with R responses). This
would not be the case for positive words, as the positive
self system is less interconnected in depression (Dozois and
Dobson 2001). For that matter, Moritz et al. (2005) showed
that depressed patients falsely recognized more depression-
related words than comparison participants. Future studies
could investigate whether both enhanced false recognitions
of negative words and enhanced correct recognitions of
negative words reinforce the negative cognitive structure of
depressed patients.
A third possible hypothesis regarding the enhanced R
responses for negative words in depressed people refers to
encoding in reference to the self. Watkins et al. (2000)
proposed that this factor might contribute to mood-
congruent memory biases in depressed patients. In the
present study, at least two factors could have contributed to
self-referential encoding. On the one hand, the negative
attributional style (tendency to attribute the causality of
negative events to internal factors) that characterizes
depressed patients could have favored the encoding of
negative words in reference to the self (Abramson et al.
1989). On the other hand, the use of verbs (e.g., ‘to cry’)
rather than nouns (e.g., ‘tears’) may have facilitated
encoding in reference to the self. Nouns label something
in the world whereas verbs depend more on the semantic
context in which they are used (Kersten and Earles 2004).
One possible assumption regarding depressed patients is
that they see themselves as the context of encoding for
negative verbs. Consequently, recollection of negative
verbs may be enhanced since the self serves to cue the
encoding context at the time of recognition.
As mentioned above, a mood-congruent memory bias
has been evidenced when words are consciously recollected
(R responses) but there was no overall reduction of R
responses contrary to the findings of Ramponi et al. (2004)
who used the R/K/G procedure to investigate memory for
neutral words in dysphoric participants. Ramponi et al.
(2004) found that the dysphoric participants made fewer R
responses than comparison participants and there was no
group difference for K responses. That study and this one,
however, are very different in terms of the sample
(dysphoric vs. depressed) and the stimuli (neutral words
vs. neutral and emotional words). Using a mixed list of
words (neutral and emotional words) may have enhanced
the attention that depressed patients paid to the words
overall (including, by extension, the neutral words) during
the encoding phase, thereby preventing any decrease in
their overall number of R responses. Moreover, the negative
verbs used were not all specifically related to depression
what could have weakened the enhanced recognition effect
for these words in depressed patients. This may have
contributed to the lack of difference between groups
specifically for negative words. Finally, the absence of a
group difference could also be related to the fact that the
samples are rather small, which could have had an
influence on the statistical power to detect differences.
In addition to the findings for R responses, the results
also showed a group difference for the amount of K
responses. Several hypotheses can be formulated to
interpret this finding. Firstly, it can be postulated that part
of the depressed patients’ attention was captured by aspects
independent of the task (e.g., ruminations) and this may
have decreased the amount of K responses. Indeed, divided
attention during the encoding process can resulted in fewer
K responses (Mangels et al. 2001) and in fewer R responses
(but see Parkin et al. 1995 for contradictory results) but no
evidence for this latter result was found in the present study.
A second interpretation is related to the nature of K
responses. To engage in familiarity-based recognition,
people have to use clues such as fluency of processing
due to repetition (Jacoby and Dallas 1981) and/or the
positive affect that can also result from repeated presenta-
tion of words (mere exposure effect, Zajonc 1968). From
this perspective, at least two assumptions can be made. On
the one hand, depressed patients may have fewer clues on
which they can base their familiarity-based recognition
decisions (e.g., processing fluency, positive affect). Quoniam
et al. (2003), for example, showed that depressive patients
are unable to develop positive affect for previously
presented material. On the other hand, depressed people
may develop clues but be less able to rely on them (e.g.,
difficulties attributing the clues to the correct source).
Finally, it is worth noting that the results suggest that
neither the intensity of the depression nor the fact that a
person has repeatedly experienced depressive episodes
determines the mood-congruent memory effect. It can be
hypothesized that certain phenomena that accompany being
depressed (e.g., activation of negative schemata, attentional
bias) matter more than the intensity of the symptoms or the
fact of having experienced past episodes.
Certain limitations on the present study must be
acknowledged. For one thing, there was no objective
measure of rumination, which could have enabled a direct
test of the proposed hypothesis. Moreover, it should be
recognized that a bigger sample could have enhanced the
statistical power. Furthermore, it should also be noted that
almost all the patients were taking different medication at
the time of testing and that the effects of medication on
memory performance for valenced material still remain to
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be clarified. Finally, it should be noted that the negative
words were more arousing than the positive words, which
were more arousing than the neutral words1. In this regard,
it could be that a different arousal level across word
categories enhanced both recollection (R responses) and
familiarity (K responses; Kensinger and Corkin 2003).
However, differences in arousal level seem not to be a
central feature as there were within-group differences in
performance.
In conclusion, in this study, no mood-congruent memory
pattern was found for the discrimination indices but it was
shown that in depressed patients, a particular state of
consciousness, namely recollection, is associated with the
increased recognition of negative words over neutral and
positive words. The exploration of memory in depression
with the R/K/G procedure offers the opportunity to analyze
recognition performance more accurately than traditional
approaches would allow.
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